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THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRIVATE PRACTITIONER 
L. Robert Primoff* 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCP A) has had a 
noticeable impact on the ability of U.S. companies to obtain and re-
tain business abroad. I will focus on the problems of the FCP A as 
some private practitioners see them. Particularly for those 
representing small companies, the FCP A has had an adverse ef-
fect on the character, extent and quality of our overseas business. 
I. THE IMPACT OF THE FCPA ON U.S. BUSINESS 
A recent State Department survey of 115 United States 
foreign service posts showed that thirty-nine percent of the posts, 
in countries with which the U.S. has significant commercial rela-
tions, report that the FCPA has caused a loss of competitiveness. 
The perceived loss is apart from any question of bribery. Those 
posts reporting- sixty percent of the posts in the Middle East and 
East Asia, fifty percent of the African posts, about forty percent 
of the Latin American posts, and fifteen percent of those in 
Europe - confirm the adverse impact of the Act. A survey con-
ducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO), consisting of 
questionnaires sent to 250 companies randomly chosen from the 
Fortune list of the top 1000 companies, also indicates the adverse 
effect of the Act. 1 
As some private practitioners interpret the statistics, and as 
the GAO interprets them, more than thirty percent of the com-
panies reported that they lost business as a result of the FCP A. 
Among companies in the construction and aircraft businesses, the 
figure was about fifty-four percent. Moreover, sixty percent of all 
respondents perceived that U.S. companies could not successfully 
compete against other companies engaged in bribery. Now, that is 
not an indication that they should bribe, but it is a statement 
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about what we are going to be facing if an international corrupt 
practices treaty is not achieved. 
It is important to note that the loss of business, both real and 
perceived, is not due primarily to the inability to bribe. Rather, it 
has, to a large extent, been caused by the difficulty of determining 
what kind of action constitutes illegal bribery. Excessive record-
keeping and accounting, necessitated by the provisions of the Act, 
go far beyond the goal of proscribing bribery. The unwillingness 
of foreign buyers and their representatives to become enmeshed 
in the coils of the Act has also caused business losses. 
According to the GAO survey, and according to the Senate 
Banking Committee Report on S. 708,2 many firms have with-
drawn from ex'isting markets or failed to enter new ones as a 
result of the uncertainty and difficulty caused by the Act. Many 
firms have lost valuable contracts because of the time needed to 
check agents and institute safeguards. Firms have withdrawn 
from joint ventures for fear of liability for the actions of their 
foreign partners, and have incurred prohibitively high costs in in-
vestigating their foreign sales agents. Very frequently, firms have 
simply been unable to obtain the services of an effective sales 
agent. 
It has been estimated that the grey area, where firms are 
uncertain over what is permissible under the Act, has had a truly 
chilling effect on U.S. export trade. As a rule of thumb, depending 
on which Senator you listen to, each billion dollars in exports is 
the equivalent of 40,000 jobs. Moreover, the U.S. share of 
worldwide business has declined sharply. In 1977, the U.S. ranked 
fourth in worldwide construction and industrial project activities. 
By 1979, the figure had fallen to seventh worldwide. 
II. ENFORCEMENT OF THE FCPA 
Although Congress, when it enacted the FCP A, seemed to ex-
pect cooperation between the agencies and the business communi-
ty, no real help has been forthcoming. In September 1978, only 
nine months after the Act was passed, President Carter directed 
the Department of Justice to give the business community 
guidance regarding its intentions to enforce the Act. It was only in 
March 1980, eighteen months later, that the Department of 
2. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO ACCOM-
PANY S. 708, S. REP. No. 209, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-10 (1981). 
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Justice implemented its guidance program. Unfortunately, most 
observers view the program as not very useful. By January 1981, 
only five firms had asked for guidance. 
For example, the attitude of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has been less than helpful. The SEC, charged with 
civil enforcement of the bribery provisions, has primary jurisdic-
tion over the accounting and control provisions of the Act. Initial-
ly, however, the SEC refused to be bound after May 31, 1981 by 
any clearance regarding the bribery provisions given by the 
Department of Justice. Although the agency has since agreed to 
go along, the refusal did little to assist U.S. companies in comply-
ing with the Act. The SEC has, until fairly recently, taken a very 
hard-nosed position. A former Director of Enforcement for the 
SEC is reported to have said in response to an early request that 
the SEC provide guidelines, "We do not have guidelines for 
rapists, muggers and embezzlers, and I do not think we need 
guidelines for corporations who want to bribe foreign officials." 
Richard Shine expressed a similar point of view in 1979, at a 
forum sponsored by the American Society of International Law: 
[T]o the extent that businessmen are waiting for guidelines 
which may in some way narrow the scope of the Act, I think they 
are waiting in vain. I would anticipate from the point of view of 
the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission that whatever is done will be geared not toward a 
restrictive, but toward a broad interpretation of the Act, which 
will maximize enforcement, since they do not in any way intend 
to provide what some have called a road map to bribery.3 
Why were guidelines so urgently sought by the business com-
munity? Why has there been so much momentum to amend the 
Act? What are some of the negative features that are the subject 
of complaints? 
III. THE FCPA ACCOUNTING AND BRIBERY PROVISIONS 
The FCP A reaches two areas - (1) accounting and control and 
(2) bribery. I will focus first on the accounting and control provi-
sions, and will return to the bribery sections of the Act. 
3. Remarks by Richard Shine, Corrupt Practices in International Commercial Trans-
action, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1979). 
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A. Accounting and Control 
The accounting provisions have been burdensome, although 
subsequent administrative interpretations have lightened that 
burden. Initially, such concepts as "reasonable detail" and "rea-
sonable assurances" were not commonly understood by manage-
ment. Since the inception of the securities laws, managers have 
lived with "materiality" concepts. The FCP A language was taken 
almost verbatim from the auditing standards of the American In-
stitute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).4 That language is 
shop talk, intended and understood by accountants in their 
auditing functions. It was not very helpful to management to deter-
mining what kind of accounting and control requirements were 
necessary. 
Although both the American Bar Association and the AICP A 
believe that the statutory language incorporated the classic 
materiality standards, the SEC says "no" - the standard is reason-
ableness. 
The absence of a materiality standard exacerbated the 
vagueness and ambiguity the business community found in the 
Act. Laws of uncertain meaning, especially those punishable with 
heavy criminal sanctions, create excessive costs and care. Fifty-
five percent of those companies responding to the GAO survey 
reported that their costs exceeded their benefits. Many corporate 
officials believe that the increased documentation required by the 
FCPA is excessively costly, particularly in light of their view of 
the primary function served by this paper-gathering device - a 
defense to SEC inquiries. 
Firms incur unnecessary compliance costs, largely out of fear 
of the criminal penalities which might be imposed for unintended 
accounting errors. Some of this fear has been dissipated by more 
recent liberal interpretations of the Act, but these administrative 
interpretations could change with a change in personnel, or with a 
change in the administration. Ed Herlihy, former Assistant Direc-
tor of the Enforcement Division of the SEC, once stated that 
"every error [in a financial statement, without regard to materiali-
ty] literally could be construed to be a violation of the Act." One 
practitioner has commented that the position of the SEC seems to 
4. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Hearings on S. 708 
Before the Subcomm. on Securities and Subcomm. on Int'l Finance and Monetary Policy, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1981). 
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be: Every paper clip must be accounted for. If you have lost a 
paper clip, then there is clearly a violation of the Act. But by the 
same token, we want you to know that we are going to be reason-
able in applying this Act, and we will take into account the impor-
tance of paper clips in your company in making a decision as to en-
forcement." 
This is, of course, a prosecutor's paradise. The target is 
always guilty of the violation. The government has the option of 
deciding whether or not to prosecute. For practitioners, however, 
the situation is intolerable. We must be able to advise our clients 
as to whether their conduct violates the law, not whether this 
year's crop of administrators is likely to enforce a particular alleged 
violation. That would produce, in effect, a government of men and 
women rather than a government of law. 
The Act has also been troublesome because the SEC and the 
Department of Justice have disagreed on the interpretation of the 
FCP A. Even within the SEC there have been some disagree-
ments. Now you might well ask what this has to do with bribery, 
which is what Congress was aiming at when it enacted the FCPA. 
The answer is that the Act, as interpreted, goes far beyond cur-
tailing foreign bribery. 
Led by the SEC, there has blossomed a broad concept of cor-
porate accountability, in what seems to be a general attempt to 
legislate and regulate in the field of overall corporate manage-
ment. Many commentators feel that the main issue now being 
presented under the Act is not bribery, but issues such as evasion 
by overseas subsidiaries of foreign tax and exchange control laws. 
I do not want to get too deeply into the question of U.S. 
parent corporation responsibility for the books and record-keeping 
of its foreign subsidiaries, but I think the SEC views it in the 
following way: if the subsidiaries' accounts are consolidated in the 
parent company's report, the parent is responsible for the sub-
sidiary's books and records. If the subsidiary is accounted for on 
an equity basis, the parent will also probably be responsible. 
The Department of Justice had come up with the creative 
theory of using the mail and wire fraud statutes in enforcement. I 
would like to consider this for a minute because the Department 
has indicated that it may now use the accounting provisions of the 
FCPA in place of the mail and wire fraud statutes, under which 
some recent cases have been brought. 
Suppose an overseas subsidiary maintains two sets of books, 
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paying employees outside of the local country, so as to help the 
employees avoid local taxes or exchange control regulations, or to 
reduce the high costs of salary related expenses, such as social 
security and similar benefits. The regulatory agencies may very 
well claim that there is a violation of the accounting and control 
provisions of the Act. 
The Justice Department has sought to reach foreign bribery 
situations by way of the mail and wire fraud statutes. For exam-
ple, in two recent cases which arose before the effective date of 
the FCP A, Control Data and Williams Companies, the Depart-
ment of Justice was able to obtain consent guilty pleas from the 
defendants. The theory, which seems extraordinary to some of us, 
is that in bribing foreign officials, the defendants had defrauded 
the citizens of the foreign country of their right to the honest and 
loyal services of their government officials in the performance of 
their official duties. It does not take much more imagination to 
argue that in avoiding local tax or exchange controls, a company 
might similarly be held to be defrauding citizens of the country of 
their right to have taxes collected and exchange controls enforced. 
In fact, the Justice Department indicated in 1979 that in the future 
such cases will probably be treated as violations of the record-
keeping provision of the Act. Thus, as the enforcement agencies 
view matters, the Act reaches far more than bribery alone. 
In the case of firms registered with the SEC, the Act can be 
used to address such wide-ranging corporate practices as trans-
fers to minimize local taxes, avoidance of exchange control regula-
tions and reduction of costs 'by paying employees off the books, 
thereby avoiding social security, severance accruals and other 
salary related expenses, which in many countries are oppressively 
high. Fairly commonplace has been the practice of U.S. companies 
to pay a large portion of their American employee salaries outside 
the countries in which they are working. This can be accomplish-
ed, for example, by depositing fifty or sixty percent of those 
salaries in a U.S. bank. 
There are very significant business reasons for these prac-
tices. Most companies adjust their employee salaries to produce a 
certain net when they are transferred abroad, usually at not less 
than what they enjoyed before they were transferred. The greater 
the amount taxed away by foreign authoritjes, the more the 
employer would have to pay to produce the agreed net. This prac-
tice has been an important factor in protecting the competitive-
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ness of U.S. firms abroad and maintaining a high standard of 
employee quality at affordable costs. 
The public perception of morality in local environments is also 
a factor that must be considered. In Italy, for example, legal fic-
tions have existed with regard to taxation. The sum total of in-
come taxes due under national and local taxing statutes actually 
exceeded one hundred percent of income in certain instances. The 
reason was political. To satisfy some political parties, local taxation 
on the statute books was made prohibitively high, while there was 
an unspoken understanding that no one would ever pay more than 
a fraction of the total tax theoretically due. 
Another almost universal practice of international firms has 
been to bill local subsidiaries for "management" or other "ser-
vices". This accomplishes a two-fold benefit of reducing the local 
tax burden, since such payments are normally deductible, and 
where exchange control restrictions exist, facilitating transfers 
out of the local country in circumstances where profit repatriatfon 
would not be allowed. The practice is often used to allocate a por-
tion of central management costs to the local country. 
Of course, these transactions are disclosed to parent company 
stockholders, either specifically or in accounts reflecting them, but 
the consolidations are based on information furnished to the 
parent corporation from confidential records that are either non-
existent on the local subsidiary's books or not clearly and ac-
curately disclosed on those books. 
Suppose the local subsidiary uses two sets of books, one for 
the local authorities, and the other perfectly accurate, to provide 
figures for parent company consolidation. In this situation, even 
if the equity owners of the corporation are fully and accurately in-
formed as to the transactions of the company, and even if the 
employees and officers have acted in accordance with instructions 
of management, and even if every penny of the company's assets 
are controlled by management and carefully preserved, and even 
if there was not the slightest act of bribery or hint of corruption, 
many companies fear, perhaps justifiably, that the SEC and the 
Department of Justice would say there had been a violation of the 
Act. 
Of course, evading local laws is a risky business, and com-
panies must be prepared to take the consequences of errors in 
assessing local views of expected and acceptable conduct. But local 
subsidiaries are usually managed by nationals or resident ex-
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patriates, familiar with local cultural norms, local customs, and 
local mores. I suggest that they are better able to evaluate such 
factors than American enforcement officials thousands of miles 
away and unfamiliar with the local environment. 
Mistakes are made, naturally, and I want to tell you a story 
about a mistake that was made in Japan. At that time, resident 
aliens in Japan were required by letter of the law to report all of 
their earnings, whether paid in Japan or not. But the law was 
broadly ignored by virtually all American and other foreign firms 
having offices in Japan. These firms generally paid a large portion 
of their expatriate employees' salaries outside Japan. The 
Japanese tax rate was considerably higher than the American 
rate and since expatriate salaries were structured so as to pro-
duce an agreed after-tax net, employers could save a considerable 
amount of salary expense if large portions of their employees' 
salaries were not subject to Japanese tax. This, of course, re-
quired that the employees' Japanese tax returns omit salary 
payments made outside the country. 
Incidentally, the practice was completely legal in certain 
other countries such as England, where salaries currently earned 
by foreigners working there, but not paid in the United Kingdom 
or brought into the United Kingdom, were not subject to British 
taxation. I do not know if that is still the case, but during the 
1970s it certainly was. 
Well, one day, in 1969, a zealous tax agent in Tokyo "dis-
covered" the practice (which had been known about for years), and 
the government suddenly began investigating all foreign com-
panies, one-by-one, in alphabetical order. Criminal and civil penal-
ties were ordained and those penalties, together with interest 
charges going back for five or more years amounted in many cases 
to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Companies and their employ-
ees were offered amnesty if they immediately and voluntarily 
disclosed all such unreported amounts, and in return, the back 
period for interest and the amount of penalties was reduced. 
Now, virtually every American company in Japan at that 
time, and probably most other foreign companies. had engaged in 
this practice, and I doubt if any of them believe they were vio-
lating accepted legal, ethical or moral standards. They believed 
that a legal fiction existed, that it was accepted, and that they 
were entitled and even expected to behave as they had. 
That the Act has caused a great deal of difficulty with busi-
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nessmen, both in interpreting it and being willing to take the risks 
and incur the costs of compliance, was stated by Theodore Soren-
son, who, in 1977, had been a strong supporter of the Act. In testi-
fying before the Senate Banking Committee on the proposed 
amendment_, he said: "The vague and sweeping language of the 
present law has to my personal knowledge caused some wholly 
honorable entrepreneurs to stop doing business abroad and caused 
others to erect distorted and inefficient business structures as a 
shield against any unintended liability ."5 
B. Bribery Provisions 
I would like to turn now to the bribery provisions of the Act. 
Congress' main goal, and many believe its only goal in enacting 
the FCPA, was bribery. A Senate report on S. 305,6 which was the 
bill that became the FCP A, makes the statement: "[T]aken to-
gether, the accounting requirements and criminal prohibitions 
should effectively deter corporate bribery of foreign government 
officials."7 Most people are opposed to the bribery of government 
officials, especially in the arrant forms that emerged during the 
1970s. Those disclosures genuinely affected the prestige of 
American democracy abroad, possibly more because of the publici-
ty than because of the acts themselves. They also jeopardized the 
support of friendly nations, impaired our foreign policy and shook 
public confidence in the financial integrity of American companies. 
In candor, however, some would disagree that it is the job of 
the American Congress to export American law and ethics to the 
world community, criminalizing here acts which not only have 
taken place in a foreign sovereign nation, but which are not 
punished, and are in many cases not even punishable, where they 
have occurred. The failure of the world community to adopt an ef-
fective international agreement against corrupt practices is per-
haps the most serious factor casting doubt on the advisability of 
the FCP A, given the enormous competitive disadvantage thus 
created for American firms. 
I would like now to review some of the specific bribery provi-
sions that have caused problems. First, the "reason to know" 
5. Id. at 401. 
6. SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO ACCOM-
PANY S. 305, S. REP. No. 114, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
7. Id. at 3. 
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clause to which we referred. The Act prohibits any payment to a 
person if the payer knows, or has reason to know, that all or a por-
tion of the payment will be given directly or indirectly to a foreign 
political official. For lawyer and client alike, the "reason to know" 
language creates a massive problem. In the interest of protecting 
his client, many corporate legal advisors have equated "reason to 
know" with "reason to suspect." Theodore Sorenson, in his 
testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, stated that: 
"(N)o other provision of the Act has caused more confusion and 
deterred more export activity on the part of many an American 
businessman who had no intention to pay bribes but a great fear 
of finding himself unintentionally liable for the unauthorized, un-
foreseeable and unknown acts of his company's independent 
agents whose misdeeds some prosecutor might someday allege, 
that businessman had 'reason to know' ."8 
This difficulty has made many U.S. firms reluctant to par-
ticipate in joint ventures with foreign businessmen because of the 
fear of criminal prosecution resulting from unexpected conduct by 
their business associates. This problem is especially acute in the 
case of small businesses which, after all, do not have large 
organizations, and have to deal through an agent or through a 
local partner. 
Second, the Act is ambiguous in its definition of a "foreign of-
ficial". The l~nguage is problemmatical for two reasons. First, is 
an employee of a government-owned business, such as a govern-
ment-owned airline, a public official? Second, and more serious, is 
the definition of "grease payments" or "facilitating payments". In-
stead of saying that grease or facilitating payments are permitted, 
the Act states that payments to "ministerial" or "clerical" 
employees are not prohibited. Ironically, read literally, the Act 
seems to suggest that a large corrupt payment to a ministerial or 
clerical employee would be all right, but that a small "grease" pay-
ment to a Prime Minister to get rotting bananas off the dock, 
would be a criminal act. 
A third problem is with the word "corrupt." As you know, the 
FCPA prohibits only "corrupt" payments. But what of gifts, enter-
tainment and travel expenses? According to the State Depart-
ment, our Athens embassy reports that the Mideast director of a 
U.S. management consulting firm is no longer allowed by his com-
8. Hearings on S. 708, supra note 4, at 402. 
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pany to send a car and driver to the airport to meet a visiting 
senior Arab government official, or place a basket of fruit in his 
hotel room, although these things are customary and normal 
courtesies. 
The definition of "corrupt" raises another problem. In many 
Third World countries, especially in the Mideast, most prominent 
businessmen also hold government offices. Payments to them or to 
their companies, whether to act as local agents for goods and ser-
vices, or by way of compensation for profit-sharing in a partner-
ship for joint venture, clearly involves the risk of allegation of im-
proper payments. The Senate Banking Committee Report on S. 708, 
reports that in Qatar, only one of that country's fourteen cabinet 
ministers has no known business ties.9 Obviously, American firms 
fear that business payments might be construed as illicit 
payments to government officials. Similar situations exist in other 
countries such as Oman and the United Arab Emirates. 
I would like also to pose a question; one that I cannot answer. 
A "corrupt" payment is a payment made to a foreign official in the 
course of obtaining or maintaining business. What about a pay-
ment made to a foreign official who authorizes work permits thus 
providing a firm with necessary staff to maintain business? Is that 
a corrupt payment? I do not know the answer. If it is not a corrupt 
payment, would it be a mail or wire fraud if it takes place by way 
of mail or wire? 
A fourth problem is defining a "facilitating payment." The 
GAO survey states that thirty percent of the respondents viewed 
this provision as unclear, and twenty-five percent viewed it as only 
marginally clear. That means that if the GAO survey is accurate, 
more than half of the companies interviewed were not actually 
sure what constitutes a "facilitating payment." 
A final area of uncertainty is the extent to which extortion 
can be a defense. The Senate Report uses as an example of such a 
defense, the threat of criminal violence, such as the blowing up of 
an oil rig. This would be a defense, because no corrupt purposes 
would be involved. What about economic extortion, such as 
threatening license revocation, expulsion from the country, or ex-
propriation? Or cutting off oil supplies so that a factory cannot be 
fueled or bauxite dug? 
The law has affected not only American companies, but their 
9. REPORT TO ACCOMPANY s. 708, supra note 2, at 7. 
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foreign trading partners. A Thai businessman says "we have been 
a nation for a 1000 years, and a culture for 3000, and resent the 
United States telling us that our business practices are immoral." 
Many foreign agents do not really want to get involved with 
us because one of the procedures adopted by many American com-
panies to comply with the Act, is to send the agent some form of 
questionnaire asking him what he does, with whom he has done it, 
and for how long. People are afraid of the Justice Department, 
even foreigners. Rightly or wrongly, they expect they may receive 
a subpoena in the mail. 
On the question of the Act's extraterritorial thrust, I do not 
think that punishing American corporations for bribery is ex-
traterritorial, but there are other extraterritorial ramifications. 
One of the clearance requests submitted to the Justice Depart-
ment in 1980 under its review procedures, involved Castle & Cook, 
which asked for clearance to permit a foreign employee of one of 
its overseas subsidiaries, who had worked for that subsidiary for 
ten years, to run for public office in his own country. He asked his 
employer for permission to retain his job while being a candidate. 
With due solemnity, restating all of the submitted facts, including 
the favorable opinion of local counsel, the Justice Department de-
termined that it did not presently intend to take enforcement ac-
tion. As the NAM asks, "does a foreign national require clearance 
from our Justice Department before he can run for elective office 
in his own country while retaining his job with a U.S. owned com-
pany? Were a U.S. citizen seeking public office in this country to 
need a similar clearance from a foreign government, ... we would 
consider it an intolerable foreign interference in our public 
affairs." 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I would like to suggest that notwithstanding the fact that the 
most sensational cases, such as Lockheed, were in the Western 
World, those were really very unusual cases. From my own ex-
perience, most of the kind of bribery we have been discussing is in 
the Third World, not in Japan, and not in Holland. According to 
the International Chamber of Commerce, corruption appears to be 
so common in Third World countries as to have been accepted as a 
way of life, which the national authorities seem unable or lack the 
political will to overcome. 
In very sharp contrast to the FPCA is the Multinational 
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Guidelines of the OECD on illicit payments. The short and succinct 
statement of the OECD provides: "Enterprises should not render-
and they should not be solicited or expected to render - any bribe 
or any improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant 
or holder of public office." 10 I recently asked a State Department 
office, from the Bureau of International Investment, Technology 
and Development, about the chances that our OECD partners will 
cooperate with us in trying to push through the international 
agreement. His comment was that they are extremely lukewarm, 
because of their cynicism, and because of their self-interest, i.e., 
helping their own companies. 
The extent to which corruption is inherent in much of the 
Third World can be gleaned from an excerpt of the 1964 Report of 
the Committee on Prevention of Corruption published by the In-
dian Government. This report attacks "grease payments" (which 
Congress and the Justice Department seem to think are all right). 
The Report states: 
Certain sections of the staff concerned are reported to have got 
into the habit of not doing anything in the matter till they are 
suitably persuaded. It was stated by a Secretary that even after 
an order has been passed, the fact of the passing of such an order 
is communicated to the persons concerned, and the order itself is 
kept back until the unfortunate applicant has paid appropriate 
gratification to the subordinate concerned. Besides being a most 
objeetionable corrupt practice, this custom of speed money has 
become one of the most serious causes of delay and inefficiency. 
It is for these reasons that the international agreement is so im-
portant, and why in the absence of such an agreement, the FCPA 
poses such difficult problems for American business. 
10. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, adopted 
June 21, 1976, Annex and Decisions of Council, OECD Doc. 21 (76) 04/1 14 (1976). 75 DEP'T 
ST. BULL. 83,87 (1976), 15 l.L.M. 967,972. 
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